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INTRODUCTION

M
any important tax policy debates hinge on how responsive individuals are to taxes. For example, the efficacy of the U.S. federal income tax deduction for charitable contributions depends, at least in part, on the magnitude of the price elasticity of giving. To understand why this is so, consider a taxpayer in the 35 percent income tax bracket. As a result of the deductibility of contributions, this taxpayer's net-of-tax price is $0.65 on the dollar. In other words, deductibility changes the relative price of giving because a taxpayer in the 35 percent bracket only pays 65 cents per dollar of charitable giving. The change in aggregate giving due to the relative price effect of deductibility obviously depends on just how responsive people are to such price effects, or the magnitude of the price elasticity of giving. If charity is sufficiently responsive (unresponsive) to changes in the tax price of giving, then the change in aggregate giving induced by a decrease in the tax price could be greater than (less than) the associated loss in tax revenue.
1 Similarly, taxes change after-tax income, and the change in aggregate giving due to changes in after-tax income depends on the income elasticity of giving. In short, it is very important for good tax policy design to have accurate estimates of income and price elasticities.
It is commonly assumed, at least implicitly, that the data used to estimate income and price elasticities provide true measures of their theoretical counterparts. This is an impor-tant assumption because even a single badly measured regressor will result in the estimated coefficient of the badly measured regressor being biased toward zero (attenuated) as well as the others though in unknown directions (Levi, 1973) . 2 Since some individuals misreport their income for tax purposes, after-tax income may be badly measured when self-reported tax data are used to estimate tax price models.
The purpose of this paper is twofold: (1) to investigate the effect of errors-in-variables due to intentional reporting errors for tax purposes, or tax evasion, on estimated coefficients in tax price models with an application to charitable giving, and (2) to evaluate a potential solution for bias due to errors-in-variables. The effect of taxes on charitable giving is a natural issue to investigate in this context. It is an important economic activity, representing over $100 billion in annual transfers. In addition, charitable giving has been the subject of numerous studies using reported tax data (Randolph, 1995; Bakjia, 1999; Auten et al., 2002) .
We examine the pattern of charitable giving using data from the IRS's 1985 Taxpayer Compliance Measurement Program (TCMP) in order to determine the direction and magnitude of the bias. These data are ideal for our purpose because they contain information as reported by the taxpayer and as corrected upon audit for each line item on the tax return and most of the accompanying schedules. Thus, the data allow us to construct two variants of each variable: conventional measures based on reported data and theoretically more appropriate measures. By comparing the estimates obtained from these two variants of the model, we are able to gauge the magnitude of the bias from errors-invariables due to tax evasion. We also can decompose the bias into the components attributable to unintentional reporting errors, intentional reporting errors, and simultaneity between charitable giving and income reporting compliance.
We find strong evidence that the estimated tax price and income elasticities are biased. We also find evidence of simultaneity between charitable giving and income reporting compliance. Collectively, these observations suggest that errors-in-variables due to tax evasion pose significant challenges to the conventional approach to estimating behavioral responses to taxes. Finally, we examine the efficacy of using the third moment of the distribution of reported after-tax income, which captures the skewness of income typically observed in cross-sectional data, as an instrument for the badly measured variable. We find that this instrument performs reasonably well. Based on this evidence, we suggest a methodology to diagnose measurement error bias, and, if present, a methodology to obtain unbiased estimates.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the second section, we briefly review the empirical literature on charitable giving and discuss the implications of errors-in-variables due to tax evasion. In the third section, we provide a brief discussion of the theoretically correct measures of after-tax income and the tax price of giving. We describe our data and the construction of the variables in the fourth section. We conclude this section with a preliminary look at the data. In the fifth section, we measure the bias attributable to errors-in-variables due to tax evasion, decompose the bias into the three sources described above, and examine the efficacy of using the third moment of income as a potential remedy for the observed bias. We conclude with a summary of our results and suggestions for further research.
LITERATURE REVIEW
A substantial literature examines the effect of taxes on real economic activities, such as labor supply, investment, savings, and charitable giving as well as income reporting compliance. This literature often relies on self-reported tax data to examine the effect of taxes on economic activity. Examples include the effect of income taxes on reported taxable income (Lindsey, 1987; Feldstein, 1995; Auten and Carroll, 1999) , capital gains realizations (Auten and Clotfelter, 1982; Burman and Randolph, 1994) , contributions to pension and retirement plans (Power and Rider, 2002) , and charitable giving (Auten and Joulfaian, 1996; Randolph, 1995) . These studies employ a variety of self-reported tax data, specifically cross-section, time series, and panel data.
For the reasons discussed above, the effect of taxes on charitable giving has attracted a great deal of attention. To varying degrees, studies find that the tax price is an important determinant of giving. Clotfelter and Steuerle (1981) , Clotfelter (1985) , Randolph (1995) , Bakjia (1999) , and Auten at al. (2002) use tax data on individual itemizers with sample sizes ranging from 7,000 to over 45,000. Employing a variety of empirical techniques, these studies find price elasticities ranging from -0.42 to -1.34 and income elasticities ranging from 0.67 to 1.23.
A large number of studies also empirically attempt to gauge the effect of tax rates on evaded income. The findings are somewhat contradictory: some studies provide support for a negative correlation between tax rates and income reporting compliance (Clotfelter, 1983; Rider, 1996 and 1998) , while others find a positive correlation (Graetz and Wilde, 1985; Feinstein, 1991) . Nevertheless, this literature shows that tax rates play an important role in income reporting compliance too. Slemrod (2001) argues that changes in a reported economic activity for tax purposes and tax compliance may represent two sides of the same coin. In other words, a reported change in economic activity may simply reflect a change in patterns of tax compliance in response to changing tax rates. Slemrod (1989) examines the effect of taxes on giving in the presence of misreported charitable contributions for tax purposes. More specifically, he estimates two versions of a log-linear model of charitable giving using 1982 TCMP data. In one version of the model, the dependent variable is reported charitable contributions and, in the other, auditor-adjusted or corrected contributions. In both specifications, the regressors are based on reported taxpayer attributes. He finds that the estimates are only modestly affected by the choice of dependent variable. For example, the estimated price elasticity changes by approximately 15 percent. This is qualitatively similar to the findings in Clotfelter (1985, p. 92) , who uses 1969 TCMP data.
As previously discussed, changing patterns of reporting compliance may also introduce errors in the regressors. Specifically, income may be understated for tax purposes. In contrast to a badly measured dependent variable, an independent variable measured with white-noise errors may result in significant bias (Goldberger, 1964; Theil, 1961; Fuller, 1987; Greene, 1990) . If, for example, a single regressor is measured with white-noise errors, not only is the coefficient on the badly measured variable biased toward zero, or attenuated, but so are the others though in unknown directions (Levi, 1973) . To the best of our knowledge, the literature on the consequences of measurement errors generally assumes unintentional, white-noise reporting errors. Therefore, we are not able to draw firm conclusions from this literature on the potential bias from intentional reporting errors for tax purposes that are likely to be a function of regressors in the model of interest. For the interested reader, we provide a technical discussion of these issues in an Appendix.
In order to empirically determine the direction and magnitude of the bias, we estimate a model of charitable giving using data as reported on tax returns and as corrected upon audit. By comparing the estimates from two variants of the model, we can gauge the magnitude of the bias attributable to reporting errors and decompose the bias into that attributable to unintentional reporting errors, intentional reporting errors, and simultaneity among the error terms. Before turning to our multivariate analysis, however, we briefly discuss the theoretically correct measures of after-tax income and tax price of giving, describe our data, and describe the construction of the variables used in this study.
THEORETICAL MEASURES OF AFTER-TAX INCOME AND THE TAX PRICE OF GIVING
Errors-in-variables due to tax evasion raise a number of interesting issues regarding the theoretically correct measures of after-tax income and the tax price of giving. As previously noted, researchers often use self-reported tax data to gauge the effect of taxes on charitable giving as well as other activities. Researchers using such data commonly employ measures of after-tax income and the tax price that are constructed from taxpayer-reported attributes. Such measures, however, are unlikely to be theoretically correct as the data are subject to intentional as well as unintentional reporting errors. Ignoring for the moment the implications of tax enforcement for the measurement of these two variables, the theoretically correct measure of the tax price should reflect reporting errors. In other words, the tax price should be computed with reported income (Y R ). An example helps to explain why the true tax price of charitable giving should be calculated in this manner. Suppose a taxpayer's marginal tax rate (t 1 ) calculated using his true income (Y T ) is 35 percent, and suppose further that the taxpayer intentionally misreports income (Y R ) in order to reduce his or her reported tax liability in an amount sufficient to lower the marginal tax rate to, say, 25 percent (t 2 ). If this taxpayer makes an additional $1 tax deductible contribution, while assuming the probability of detection is equal to zero, then the taxpayer's reported tax liability is reduced by 25 cents. In this example, the effective, net-of-tax price of charitable giving is 0.75, or 1 -0.25, which reflects a marginal tax rate computed with reported income.
Continuing for the moment to ignore the potential role of tax enforcement, the theoretically correct measure of after-tax income is true income (Y T ) less the tax liability reported by the taxpayer (T 2 ). This measure of after-tax income gives us the best measure of the resources available to the individual for consumption, saving, and charitable giving. Since we assume zero detection thus far, the tax liability (T 1 ) based on true income is irrelevant. Now, consider the role of tax enforcement on the measurement of these variables. Suppose in the above example the taxpayer believes that there is a 25 percent chance that the IRS will uncover the misreporting of income. The theoretically correct measure of the tax price should then be the expected tax price of giving, or E(t) = p(1 -t 1 ) + (1 -p)(1 -t 2 ), where p is the probability of detection. In the foregoing example, the expected tax price of giving is equal to 0.725, or 0.25 * (1-0.35) + (1-0.25) * (1-0.25). Likewise, the theoreti-cally correct measure of after-tax income is true income less expected tax liability, or
In the discussion below of the bias attributable to errors-in-variables, we compare estimates obtained by assuming a zero probability of detection and estimates obtained using expected after-tax income and the expected tax price with conventional estimates using reported tax data. We find evidence of significant bias due to errorsin-variables; but, we find that the assumption of a zero probability of detection makes little difference in the estimates compared to those obtained with the expected-value measures of the variables.
THE DATA
Obtaining the necessary data to construct appropriate measures is a significant obstacle to implementing the approach described above. For this purpose, we use data from the IRS's 1985 Taxpayer Compliance Measurement Program (TCMP). These data contain information as reported by the taxpayer and as corrected upon audit for each line item on the tax return and most of the accompanying schedules. Thus, the data allow us to construct two variants of each variable: conventional measures based on taxpayer reported data and theoretically more appropriate measures, using, as the case requires, corrected measures and/or taxpayer reported measures. In calculating the expected-value measures, we use objective audit probabilities obtained from IRS (1985b) .
The TCMP data consist of a stratified random sample of approximately 49,162 randomly selected tax returns for tax year 1985 that are subject to extensive line-by-line review by experienced IRS tax examiners. Consistent with many in the literature, we eliminate returns reporting negative income and non-itemizers. We also exclude those subject to the alternative minimum tax (AMT) because we lack the necessary detail to calculate this tax. The resulting sample contains 26,286 taxpayers, which is augmented with published information on objective audit probabilities (IRS, 1985b) .
Variable Construction
In our model of charitable giving we employ variables commonly used in the literature. These are after-tax income, the tax price of giving, and select demographic information. Each variable is constructed from data as reported by the taxpayer and as corrected upon audit. The following is a brief description of the construction of these variables. For the reader's convenience, a summary of the construction of the variables is summarized in Table 1 .
Charitable contributions are obtained from Schedule A of Form 1040 and represent the sum of cash and non-cash contributions and any contributions carried over from prior years. As reported in Table 1 , the mean reported contribution is $2,216 and the mean corrected contribution is $2,100. Based on reported data (see Table  2 ), 93.2 percent of the observations, or 24,496, report positive contributions. This fraction drops to 91.7 percent, or 24,094 observations, on an auditor-adjusted basis.
After-tax income is defined as total income less federal and state tax liability. As described above, we construct three variants of after-tax income. As reported in Table 1 , the sample mean of corrected income less taxpayer reported tax liability is $57,214, the sample mean of taxpayerreported after-tax income is $54,577, and the sample mean of corrected income less expected tax liability is $57,153.
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As previously discussed, the theoretically correct marginal tax rate should account for income reporting compliance. Consequently, we employ marginal tax rates constructed from reported tax data. The tax price is computed with first-and last-dollar marginal tax rates using reported attributes. These rates are computed by adding $100 to charity and calculating the change in tax liability using detailed federal and state tax calculators (see Auten and Carroll, 1999) . First-dollar tax rates are obtained by computing the taxpayer's liability in the absence of charitable contributions. As with after-tax income, an alternative measure of tax rates is constructed to reflect the probability of an audit by the IRS.
Since individuals may contribute a combination of cash gifts and appreciated assets, the tax price incorporates capital gains tax rates as well. More specifically, the tax price is computed as the weighted average of the net-of-tax price of cash and non-cash gifts, or 1 -
, where Θ k is the share of appreciated assets in total charitable contributions by AGI class which is indicated by subscript k, t o is the ordinary income tax rate, t c is the capital gains tax rate, G is the amount of accrued gains, V is the market value, and δ is a discount factor reflecting the expected holding period during which the capital gains tax is deferred and there is the possibility of escaping taxation by the step up in basis at Feldstein (1975) and Feldstein and Clotfelter (1976) , the factor δ G/V is assumed to equal 0.50, which is also consistent with many recent studies. Finally, the mean reported first (last) dollar tax price is 0.673 (0.676) and the mean corrected first (last) dollar tax price is 0.662 (0.663).
In addition to after-tax income and the tax price of giving, we also consider three demographic variables commonly used in the literature: indicator variables for marital status, age 65 years and over, and the number of dependents. Approximately 81.6 percent of the observations in the sample are married; 14 percent are age 65 or over; and the average number of dependents is 1.06. The descriptive statistics of the log transformations of charitable giving, after-tax income, and the tax price of giving as well as the demographic variables are reported in Table 2 . Table 3 tells a very interesting story. We sort our sample of 26,286 returns according to reported after-tax income and corrected income less reported federal tax liability. Each cell in this matrix corresponds to a pair of reported and corrected incomes. For example, the cell in the ninth row and sixth column of Table 3 indicates that 21 taxpayers reported income The capital gain tax rate is computed by adding $100 to gains, with and without charitable contributions. The fraction of non-cash gifts in total charitable giving are computed for 18 adjusted gross income (AGI) classes from information published in the Statistics of Income Bulletin (IRS, 1985a) . We also estimate variants of the model without accounting for the step up in basis at death and the accrual of gains, and set δ G/V = 1. The estimates for these specifications are little changed from those obtained in the base case, described.
A Preliminary Look at the Data
between $50,000 and $60,000, but their corrected income is greater than $100,000. Their average reported contributions are $2,062, while their corrected contributions are $1,902. Examining Table 3 , the returns along the main diagonal are relatively compliant, at least within the tolerances of the cell ranges. Taxpayers below the diagonal misreport their attributes in a manner that lowers their tax liability, while those above the main diagonal misreport their attributes in a manner that increases their reported tax liability. Clearly, the majority of returns are in cells lying along the main diagonal, and there are more returns below the diagonal than above it. In other words, and perhaps to no one's surprise, there is a decided tendency to make reporting errors to one's advantage rather than to one's disadvantage. Presumably the disadvantageous reporting errors are accidental or unintentional. It also seems reasonable to assume that accidental reporting errors are symmetrically distributed about correct income. Thus, the asymmetric distribution about the diagonal suggests that some reporting errors are deliberate. There is a substantial theoretical and empirical literature on tax compliance that suggests deliberate reporting errors, or tax evasion, are correlated with after-tax income and the tax price. Finally, it seems reasonable to assume that accidental reporting errors are classical white-noise reporting errors. As shown in the Appendix, both intentional and unintentional reporting errors have detrimental effects on the consistency of OLS estimates.
Another pattern is evident from examining the row and column sums of Table 3 . As corrected (reported) income increases, average corrected (reported) charitable contributions increase. In general, the average reported contribution is greater than the average corrected contribution. For example, the column totals of Table 2 show that the average reported contribution increases from $547 to $9,531, which corresponds to reported income less than $10,000 and greater than $100,000, respectively. A similar pattern is evident for the rows. For example, corrected contributions increase from $491 to $8,558, which corresponds to corrected income less than $10,000 and greater than $100,000, respectively.
In summary, Table 3 suggests that there is sufficient evidence of intentional and unintentional errors-in-variables to be concerned about the consistency of estimates obtained with taxpayer reported data.
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
In order to determine the magnitude of the bias from errors-in-variables due to tax evasion in tax price models, we estimate two variants of a standard log-linear model of charitable giving. Since some of the observations do not report a deduction for charitable giving, the dependent variable is defined as ln[max(G,1) ], where G is either corrected or reported charitable contributions.
6 Consistent with much of the existing literature, we first employ reported data to estimate the effect of taxes on charitable giving. Then, we estimate the model using the theoretically correct measures, described above. By comparing the two sets of estimates we are able to determine the magnitude of the bias.
In an attempt to make our findings comparable to those of Clotfelter (1985) and Slemrod (1989) , we begin with OLS estimates of charitable giving. Here the first dollar measure of the tax price is employed. We first employ data as reported, followed by estimates using the theoretically appropriate measures of the variables assuming zero detection. When using reported data, as shown in column 1 of Table 4 , the estimated tax price and income elasticities are -0.585 (S.E. = 0.118) and 0.873 (S.E. = 0.032), respectively. When corrected contributions, corrected income (less reported tax), and corrected demographic variables are employed, the respective estimated coefficients are -1.209 (S.E. = 0.11) and 0.778 (S.E. = 0.031), as reported in column 2. In short, the estimated price elasticity is dramatically underestimated, there is a more modest decline in the estimated income elasticity, and the remaining estimates increase. Columns 2, 4, 7, 9: All variables are constructed from auditor-adjusted data, except after-tax income which is corrected total income minus reported tax liability, and the tax price which is computed with taxpayer reported data.
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Column 5: All variables are constructed from auditor-adjusted data, except for expected tax liability in the measurement of after-tax income and the expected tax price. 
Two-Stage Estimates
Because the last-dollar tax price is endogenous, we next model charitable giving, reported and as corrected, using Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS). 7 The estimates reported in column 3 of Table 4 , like those reported in column 1, employ conventional measures of each variable constructed from self-reported tax data. The estimated tax price and income elasticities are -0.668 (S.E. = 0.135) and 0.852 (S.E. = 0.036), respectively. These estimates are generally consistent with those reported in the charitable giving literature for the same period. For example, O'Neil, Steinberg and Thompson (1990) , who also use 1985 reported tax data, obtain estimates of price and income elasticities within the same range: -0.89 (S.E. = 0.05) and 0.71 (S.E. = 0.01), respectively. The estimates in column 3 also show that married taxpayers and those over 65 contribute more, and giving increases with the number of dependents.
In contrast, the estimates reported in column 4, as in column 2, use more accurate measures of contributions, income, and demographics. Based on these measures, the estimated price elasticity is -1.324 (S.E. = 0.121), which is almost twice as large, in absolute value, as the estimate obtained with reported data. The estimated income elasticity is 0.748 (S.E. = 0.034), which is similar to the estimate obtained with reported data, though slightly smaller in magnitude. As before, the remaining variables are positive and significant, though slightly larger in magnitude. In short, the estimated income and price elasticities appear to be biased downward, in absolute value, due to measurement error. 8 As previously discussed, a good case can be made that it is the tax liability adjusted for the likelihood that evasion will be detected through an audit, i.e., the "expected tax," that influences behavior, and not the reported tax. When the detection rate is zero, the expected tax liability and the reported tax liability are equal. If, however, the probability of detection is positive, then the expected after-tax income and expected tax price may be different from the measures we have employed thus far. We calculate expected after-tax income and expected tax price using objective audit probabilities, which may be poor proxies for the taxpayer's subjective detection probabilities. As reported in column 5, using these adjusted measures of tax price and income has little effect on the estimated coefficients; they are virtually identical to those in column 4.
Although the 2SLS specification accounts for the potential endogeneity of the tax price, this specification may not be entirely satisfactory because the dependent variable is censored at zero. Since only 8.3 percent of the observations (6.8 percent in the case of corrected data) do not make charitable contributions, this is unlikely to be a serious problem (Randolph, 1995; Bakjia, 1999) . Nevertheless, we re-estimate the equations reported in columns 3 and 4 using Two Stage Tobit (TST). The estimated tax price coefficients are -0.708 (S.E. = 0.139) and -1.281 (S.E. = 0.107), respectively. Similarly, the income coefficients are 0.889 (S.E.=0.036) and 0.821 (S.E.=0.029). These estimates are fairly similar to those reported in columns 4 and 5.
In order to isolate the bias due to errors in the regressors from those in the depen-dent variable, we use auditor-adjusted charitable contributions in both variants of the model. We estimate a variant of the 2SLS specification in column 3 in which the regressors are based on reported attributes, but the dependent variable is corrected giving rather than reported giving. In this case, the estimated price elasticity is -0.689 (S.E. = 0.142), and the income elasticity is 0.879 (S.E. = 0.038). Like Clotfelter (1985) and Slemrod (1989) , we observe little change in the estimates from using corrected contributions. Similarly, little difference is observed in the estimated coefficients when we regress reported contributions on the theoretically more appropriate measures of the regressors, as in column 4. More specifically, the estimated tax price elasticity is -1.168 (S.E. = 0.114) and income elasticity is 0.764 (S.E. = 0.032). These results suggest that there is little bias resulting from errors in the dependent variable.
Before proceeding, we examine other potential explanations for the observed difference in the estimates, including changing collinearity among the regressors, the influence of outliers, and measurement issues due to certain features of the tax code. Since the reported marginal tax rate is a non-linear function of reported income, and by extension corrected income, the estimated tax price elasticity must be identified by this non-linear relationship. Consequently, the estimated tax price elasticities reported in columns 3 and 4 may be sensitive to changes in the measure of after-tax income. More specifically, it is possible that when we substitute auditor-adjusted income for reported income and retain the tax price computed with reported data, we may weaken the link between after-tax income and the tax price.
The correlation coefficient between the reported first-dollar tax price and reported after-tax income is -0.2606, and -0.2598 with respect to corrected income. As the simple correlation coefficients indicate, there is "substantial" correlation between both income measures and the tax price. The issue at hand is whether the modest decline in correlation obtained by changing the control variable accounts for the dramatic increase in the estimated tax price elasticities. In order to shed further light on this issue, we conduct the following experiment. We split our sample by corrected AGI greater than or less than $100,000 and re-estimate both versions of the model on these two sub-samples. If changing collinearity among the regressors is the real culprit here, we should not expect to see substantial change in the estimates obtained on the sub-sample with AGI ≥ $100,000 because there is more independent cross-sectional variation in state rates at the high end of the income distribution. Indeed, the simple correlation coefficients bear this out; the corresponding correlation coefficients for the AGI ≥ $100,000 sample are -0.133 and -0.105, respectively.
In columns 6 and 7 of Table 4 , we report the estimates for the sub-sample with AGI < $100,000 obtained with data as reported and as corrected, respectively. The estimated tax price elasticity increases in absolute value from -0.624 (S.E. = 0.162) to -1.136 (S.E. = 0.144), when corrected data are used in place of reported data. Perhaps not surprisingly, these results are qualitatively very similar to our previous results, but they do not speak to the role of changing collinearity among the regressors. Corresponding estimates obtained on the sample of returns with AGI ≥ $100,000, reported in columns 5 and 6, increase from -0.629 (S.E.= 0.304) to -2.154 (S.E. = 0.283). Again, very similar qualitative results are observed: the estimates obtained with the errors-in-variables model are attenuated. It is interesting to note that the observed bias is considerably more severe for the high-income sub-sample. This may have a simple explanation. High income individuals have a greater opportunity to misreport tax attributes. Consequently, the measurement error is more severe for the high-income sub-sample, and it follows that there is greater attenuation of the estimates.
To make sure that the estimates are not driven by a few outliers, we estimate both variants of the model on a sub-sample that excludes observations where misreported income exceeds 50 percent of corrected income (N = 25,792) . We observe the same qualitative change in the estimates reported in Table 4 for the entire sample: a near doubling of the estimated tax-price elasticity and a modest decline in the income elasticity. More specifically, the estimates of the income and tax price using reported data are 0.977 (0.039) and -0.340 (0.140), respectively. In contrast, the estimates using more appropriate measures of the variables are 0.910 (S.E. = 0.038) and -0.776 (S.E. = 0.134), respectively. We also estimate both variants of the model on the returns that lie on the three middle diagonals. The qualitative results are very similar to those reported above.
Two features of the tax code create some ambiguity about the correct way to measure the tax price of contributions. First, taxpayers generally cannot deduct contributions in excess of 50 percent of AGI in the current tax year. These excess contributions can be carried over and deducted in the future. To the extent that the timing of these deductions is uncertain (Joulfaian, 2001) , the tax price is not accurately measured. In order to address concerns that may arise in measuring the tax price for such individuals, we eliminate returns with contributions in excess of the 50 percent limitation and re-estimate both versions of the model. 9 The estimated tax price elasticity increases, in absolute value, from -0.477 (S.E. = 0.136) to -1.359 (S.E. = 0.122), when the more appropriate measures are used instead of conventional measures based on self-reported tax data. 10 Second, some individuals may itemize by virtue of the size of their contributions. These so-called endogenous itemizers have a first-dollar marginal tax rate equal to zero (tax price equal to 1.0), while their last-dollar rate is not. As pointed out in Clotfelter (1985) , the first-dollar rate may be a poor instrument for the last-dollar rate in these cases and this could unintentionally bias the estimates downward. This can be problematic in the case of the wealthy elderly who donate large sums to charity, but who have no mortgage to speak of and reside in states without an income tax. In order to address this concern, the price instrument is computed by adding an increment to gifts larger than $100. More specifically, this increment is defined as the maximum of $100 and 1.5 percent of pre-tax income, roughly the median size of gifts reported in the data. Thus, for an individual with an income of $100,000, the instrument would reflect gifts of $1,500. Again, we observe the same qualitative results: the estimated tax price elasticity increases from -0.800 (S.E. = 0.13) to -1.413 (S.E. = 0.117) when corrected measures are used, while the income elasticity changes from 0.821 (S.E. = 0.035) to 0.727 (S.E. = 0.033).
In short, income and tax-price elasticities estimated with self-reported tax data appear to be biased due to errors-in-variables. Indeed, and in contrast to other potential sources of bias that have received attention in this literature, the effect of errors-in-variables due to tax evasion appears to have a dramatic effect on the estimated tax-price elasticity. More specifically, 179 observations with ratios in excess of 49.9 percent are dropped. 10 Although the tax price includes state income taxes that account for deductibility of contributions, we also estimated both variants of the model using state dummy variables to account for differences among states. The income and tax price elasticies are 0.878 (0.039) and -0.517 (0.144) versus 0.753 (0.034) and -1.296 (0.127) when the theoretically correct measures are used. The qualitative results are the same: a dramatic increase in the tax price elasticity and a modest decline in the income elasticity.
11 The estimated coefficients for the income reporting compliance equation, Γ, utilize the same set of regressors as those used to obtain "consistent" estimates of the charitable giving parameter vector β reported in column 2 of Table 5 . In order to estimate the parameter vector Γ, the dependent variable is defined as log (reported after-tax income) minus log (corrected income less reported tax liability). The estimated income and tax price elasticities for income reporting compliance are -0.250 (S.E. = 0.003) and -1.003 (S.E.=0.011), respectively. These estimates are consistent with findings that suggest that income-reporting compliance increases with the tax rate (e.g., decreases with the tax price) and income. This regression differs from conventional models of income reporting compliance because it omits any controls for the probability of detection. The second moment matrices, Q and Q * , are computed with the data used to estimate the coefficients reported in columns 1 and 2 of Table 5 , respectively.
Decomposition of the Bias
In the Appendix, we show that the bias from errors-in-variables due to reporting errors for tax purposes can be expressed as follows:
The first term of the bracketed expression is the bias attributable to unintentional reporting errors. The second term is a function of Γ, which is the parameter vector from the income reporting compliance equation. Thus, it reflects the bias attributable to intentional reporting errors. The third term is a function of the white-noise error terms from the charity equation (ε) and the income-reporting-compliance equation (Ω), and, thus, it reflects the bias attributable to simultaneity between the two activities. In order to gauge the contribution of each component empirically, we report OLS estimates obtained by using corrected contributions as the dependent variable in both variants. The OLS estimated coefficients reported in column 1 of Table 5 are obtained by regressing corrected contributions on reported after-tax income and corrected demographic variables. Those reported in column 2 are obtained by regressing corrected contributions on corrected data, as in column 2 of Table 4 . In contrast to the estimates reported in Table 4 , in this exercise the only variable measured with error is after-tax income. Otherwise both specifications employ identical measures of the dependent and independent variables.
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A number of patterns are worth noting in Table 5 . First, the bias attributable to Table 4 . Columns (2-4): Q and Q * are the second moment matrices of the regressors used to obtain the estimates reported in columns (1) and (2), respectively. Column (5): The bias is equal to the difference between the estimates in columns (1) and (2), or (3) = (2) -(1) = (2) - (4) - (5) The apparent simultaneity between these two activities has intriguing implications for understanding both the determinants of charitable giving and tax evasion strategies. It suggests that there may be differences in the patterns of giving among compliant and non-compliant taxpayers. For example, suppose that taxpayers can be grouped into those who are very responsive to taxes, and those who are not. It may be the case that compliance status may indicate to which group the taxpayer belongs. This suggests that a structural model of charitable giving should simultaneously account for compliance status.
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Possible Solution
Clearly it is impractical to collect costly data, like the TCMP, in order to measure the effect of taxes. Instrumental variables are a potential remedy for measurement error bias, but obtaining appropriate instruments is often difficult. Dagenais and Dagenais (1994) , Cragg (1997) and Lewbell (1997) , among others, demonstrate that consistent estimates can be obtained by using higher order moments of the observed data for 2SLS estimation. We have performed some experiments using the third moments of reported after-tax income, thereby exploiting the skewness of the distribution of income in cross-sectional data, to identify the parameters of the model. Using this approach, we are able to come close to the "true" elasticities. The estimated price elasticity is -1.560 (S.E. = 0.187), with an income elasticity of 0.578 (S.E.= 0.054).
This finding suggests the following approach to estimating tax-price models with reported tax data. The researcher should construct an instrument for the theoretically correct measure of income using third moments of reported income, perform a Hausman test for measurement error, and, if the Hausman test rejects the null hypothesis of no measurement error bias, estimate the model using an IV estimator based on the third moment of income. This approach, however, is only valid in cross-sectional studies. Future research should focus on techniques for obtaining consistent estimates with panel data subject to intentional reporting errors.
CONCLUSION
The purpose of this paper is twofold: (1) to investigate the effect of errors-in-variables due to intentional reporting errors for tax purposes, or tax evasion, on estimated coefficients in tax price models with an application to charitable giving, and (2) to evaluate a potential solution for bias due to errors-in-variables. We derive an analytic expression for the bias when reporting errors are correlated with regressors in the model. This expression decomposes the bias into components attributable to intentional reporting errors, unintentional reporting errors, and simultaneity between the two activities. Employing 1985 TCMP data, we find that income-reporting errors for tax purposes 12 The correlation coefficient for the regression residuals is 0.028 and statistically different than zero. 13 Another explanation for the apparent correlation between the residuals is that these parsimonious regressions may suffer from a common set of omitted variables. To the extent that the omitted variables are not correlated with included variables, the effect of the omitted variables would be absorbed in the residuals. This, in turn, would result in correlation among the residuals.
have dramatic effects on estimated elasticities, particularly the income and tax price elasticities. In addition, we find evidence of simultaneity between charitable giving and tax evasion. Such simultaneity should be an interesting area for further research.
Since there appears to be simultaneity between income reporting compliance for tax purposes and giving, the apparent bias due to tax evasion may not be a simple artifact of using self-reported tax data. For example, survey data typically lack information on tax evasion activities undertaken by survey respondents. Consequently, a researcher employing such data does not have the necessary information to construct the effective tax price for non-compliant taxpayers participating in the survey. In short, whether one employs self-reported tax data or survey data to estimate tax price models, tax evasion is likely to result in at least one badly measured regressor.
In order to overcome concerns with identification in tax price models, investigators are beginning to rely more heavily on panel data that straddle a major tax reform to provide the necessary exogenous variation to identify the tax price (Feenberg, 1987) . At first blush, one may suppose that using panel data to estimate tax price models with fixed effects may overcome or at least partially alleviate some of the concerns discussed above. There may be problems with this approach too. Randolph (1995) argues that cross-sectional studies are flawed because they fail to account for transitory and permanent tax price effects. However, his measure of permanent income is based on a ten-year average of reported total income. Consequently, the estimates may be biased due to mismeasurement of permanent income. He also uses the exogenous variation in tax rates induced by the tax law changes of 1981 and 1986 to identify the effect of current and future tax price effects. But, changing patterns of compliance due to changes in the tax laws may result in spurious correlation in panel studies as well. Of course, such speculations can only be resolved by empirical study, but there is no reason to believe that we should not be concerned with measurement error bias in panel studies.
It should be noted, however, that crosssectional studies have their limitations. In particular, such data do not allow us to decompose the price elasticity into short-run and long-run effects. Accordingly, this study makes no claim to being the last word on the price elasticity of giving. We have simply shown that estimates may be biased due to errors-in-variables from tax evasion in cross-sectional studies and, by extension, panel studies as well.
